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Transnational Economic Governance 
ABSTRACT 
What role do contract enforcement institutions provided by the state play for economic 
development? This question has often been addressed. However, empirical research in 
this field looks predominantly at transactions that are conducted domestically. Less re-
search exists regarding the enforceability of contracts in cross-border transactions. In 
other words, research that addresses the institutional foundations of international ex-
change processes is still in its infancy. The following case study investigates the con-
tract enforcement institutions that enable German customers to purchase software in 
Asian and East European Countries. This paper’s main argument is that nation states are 
not capable of providing a workable legal infrastructure for cross-border transactions. 
Instead, economic actors create their own informal mechanisms in order to enforce their 
contracts. Particularly important are relational contracts and reputational networks. Fur-
thermore, the empirical evidence shows that German enterprises comprehensively use 
the opportunities offered by new developments in information and communication 
technology, when it comes to the initiation and control of their foreign business rela-
tions. Due to such technical innovation, it therefore seems that both reputational net-
works and relational contracts gain more and more efficiency compared to state private 
law. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 100) 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY.........................................................................................................6 
The risks of transaction ....................................................................................................... 7 
State private law does not provide contractual certainty..................................................... 8 
The alternative meaning of contracts ................................................................................ 10 
Private contract enforcement institutions establish contractual certainty ......................... 11 
Relational contracts........................................................................................................... 11 
Reputational networks....................................................................................................... 16 
CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................20 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................22 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................................................24 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 100) 
- 1 - 
Transnational Economic Governance 
INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years now, there has been a lively debate in law, the social and eco-
nomic sciences about those institutions that could provide a sufficient degree of contrac-
tual certainty in cross-border business transactions.1 The common starting point for this 
debate is the observation that state private law cannot fulfill its function to safeguard the 
performance of contractual claims in today's globalized markets with the same reliabil-
ity it achieves in domestic markets.2 Every state has its own private law, which is in 
force within its territory. Therefore, the possibility exists that national legal systems 
collide once an economic transaction transcends national borders.3 From the perspective 
of actors interested in economic exchange, the territorial fragmentation of law leads to 
three main problems: First, uncertainty can emerge about the obligations of the contrac-
tual parties, as they can to be assessed differently according to the law applicable. Sec-
ond, it is unclear where the place of jurisdiction is for the solution of conflicts. And 
third it is often doubtful, whether judgments of one state are actually enforced in an-
other.4 In more abstract terms, economic globalization ends the congruency of economic 
and legal spaces.5 The far-reaching unity of state, law and economy is increasingly un-
                                                 
1  For a very good summary of this debate see: Gessner, Volkmar, Towards a Theoretical Framework for Contrac-
tual Certainty in Global Trade, in: Volkmar Gessner (Hrsg.), Contractual Certainty in International Trade, Oxford 
(UK) 2008, 3-27; see also: Streit, Manfred E. und Mangels, Antje, Privatautonomes Recht und grenzüberschre-
itende Transaktionen, in: 47 ORDO (1996), 73; Rühl, Giesela, "Effizienzprobleme bei grenzüberschreitenden 
Rechtsstreitigkeiten", German Working Papers in  Law and Economics: Vol. 2008, Article 17, verfügbar unter: 
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss2/art17, p. 3-5. 
2  Gessner, Towards a Theoretical Framework for Contractual Certainty in Global Trade, p. 3; Rodrik, Dani, How 
Far Will International Economic Integration Go?, in: 14 The Journal of Economic Perspectives (2000), 177, p. 
179. 
3  Berman, Paul Schiff, Global Legal Pluralism, in: 80 Southern California Law Review (2007), 1155, p. 1155; 
Gopalan, Sandeep, Transnational Commercial law, Oxford 2004; Rühl, Giesela, Methods and Approaches in the 
Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, in: 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2006), 801, p. 801 
4  See: Schmidtchen, Dieter, International Contracting and Territorial Control: The Boundary Question. Comment 
on B.V. Yarbrough and R.M. Yarbrough's article of the same name, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics (1994), 272, p. 274. 
5  Sweet Stone, Alec, Islands of Transnational Governance, in: Martin M. Shapiro/Alex Sweet Stone (Hrsg.), On 
law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford 2002, 323-342, p 323 
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done by this process.6 In short, the uncertainty whether prospective contractual partners 
behave in an opportunistic or cooperative manner is far higher at global than at domestic 
markets, as in the transnational realm actors have no unitary, private law system at their 
disposal in order to enforce contracts effectively.7 
Although there is a broad consensus about the specific problems of international 
economic transactions in the relevant literature, the proposed solutions vary signifi-
cantly. Especially lawyers stress that those problems arising out of the plurality of law 
in cross-border economic intercourse are solved by dint of private international law 
(PIL). The PIL determines which law is applicable to a cross-border transaction. Con-
cerning contractual certainty, cross-border transactions therefore approximate domestic 
business transactions.8 Ultimately, the argument here is that due to working collision 
norms economic actors can rely on state courts and enforcement authorities both in the 
domestic and transnational realm.9 Peter Behrens argues in this vein: 
“It follows from the principles of modern private international law (collision 
law) that on the whole foreign legal norms can be used as the basis of a domes-
tic judgment, while foreign judgments can be enforced domestically. In both 
cases one can argue that a sovereign action of another state, namely legislative 
acts (legal norms) and judicial decisions (judgments), are 'recognized' domesti-
cally, i.e. they are enforced by dint of the instruments of domestic sovereignty. 
As this is a universal phenomenon, it can be stated that in principle national le-
gal norms and decisions can be taken out of their territorial confines and gain 
quasi-global validity.”10 (Translation Thomas Dietz) 
 
However, this view, according to which the PIL is principally suitable to reduce the 
uncertainty of international business transactions, has met numerous objections. It is, for 
instance, a common assumption that the globalization of law cannot keep up with the 
                                                 
6  Zürn, Michael, Sovereignty and Law in a Denationalized World, in: Richard P. Appelbaum/William L. F. Fel-
stiner/Volkmar Gessner (Hrsg.), Rules and Networks. The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions, Ox-
ford 2001, 39-71 
7  Anderson, James E. und Marcouiller, Douglas, Insecurity and the pattern of trade: an empirical investigation, in: 
84 The Review of Economics & Statistics (2002), 342, p.342; Belloc, Marianna, Institutions and International 
Trade: A Reconsideration of Comparative Advantage, in: 20 Journal of Economic Surveys (2006), 3, p. 7; 
Rodrik, How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?, , p 179. 
8  See: Rühl, "Effizienzprobleme bei grenzüberschreitenden Rechtsstreitigkeiten", German Working Papers in  Law 
and Economics: Vol. 2008, Article 17, p. 9. 
9  See also to this point: Berkowitz, Daniel, Moenius, Johannes und Pistor, Katharina, Legal Institutions and Inter-
national Trade Flows, in: 26 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 163. 
10  Behrens, Peter, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 2000, 5- 27, p 17. 
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globalization of the economy.11 It is even argued that the nationally caused legal frag-
mentation (PIL is also national law) as well as the fact that different norm systems meet 
and block each other in cross-border transactions lead to significant regulatory gaps, 
norm collisions and enforcement deficits—resulting even in growing problems of cross-
border business. The legal context of cross-border trade resembles rather an anarchic 
state of nature than an area structured by law. In any case, contractual certainty is not 
provided by the PIL. In fact a constitutional uncertainty exists, which rather hampers 
than enables cross-border exchange.12 
A way out of this constitutional uncertainty is often seen in the possibility to embed 
cross-border transactions into the institutions of transnational law.13 Stressing the sig-
nificance of the so-called transnational law of the new Lex Mercatoria14 for the safe-
guard of cross-border transactions, pundits free the concept of law from its close link to 
the state: 
“The new Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant) is conceptualized as an 
autonomous legal system beyond the nation-state, which is based on common le-
gal principles, i.e. on basic rules generated through functional legal comparison 
between the common core of national private legal systems (such as the 
UNIDROIT principles) and on trade customs and habits of the international 
merchant class (such as standardized contractual conditions, like the Incoterms 
of the ICC or model contracts); while its application, interpretation and devel-
opment rest with international arbitral jurisdiction.”15(Translation Thomas 
Dietz) 
According to the transnationalists, the categorical equation of law and state obscures the 
view of the emergence of new, privately generated, legal regimes. So, private law on the 
                                                 
11  See: Rodrik, How Far Will International Economic Integration Go? , p 179-180. 
12  Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg, Außenhandel und Territorialität des Recht, Baden-Baden 1990 Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-
Jörg und Schmidtchen, Dieter, Private International Trade in the Shadow of the Territoriality of Law: Why Does 
It Work?, in: 58 Southern Economic Journal (1991), 329, p. 241-244. 
13  As far as known the term “transnational law” was first used by Phillip C. Jessup, Judge at the International Court 
of Justice. Jessup, Philip, Transnational Law, New Haven 1956. See: Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Breaking Out: The 
Proliferation of Actors in the International System, in: Yves Dezelay/Bryant G. Garth (Hrsg.), Global Prescrip-
tions 2002, 12. 
14  Berger, Klaus Peter, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, The Hague, London, Boston 1999;  
15  Calliess, Gralf Peter, Grenzüberschreitende Verbraucherverträge. Rechtssicherheit und Gerechtigkeit auf dem 
elektronischen Weltmarktplatz, Tübingen 2006, p. 198 
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global level is not created by state intervention, but by private actors who belong to spe-
cific socioeconomic networks.16 Alex Sweet Stone, for example, argues in this vain that 
„ sovereignty and control are detaching from another rapidly, at least with re-
spect to transnational commercial activity. In the past three decades, a growing 
and increasingly cohesive community of actors—including firms, their lawyers, 
and arbitration houses—have successfully created a transnational space. The 
space is comprised of a patchwork of private jurisdictions, of rules and organi-
zations without territory, an offshore yet virtual space. These are islands of pri-
vate, transnational governance."17   
In the theory of transnational law, private arbitration courts play an important role. 
They apply those norms that emerged autonomously in the social context of the global 
mercantile community and gradually specify through their judgments the legal frame-
work of cross-border transactions.18 Finally, the community of market participants safe-
guards the enforcement of arbitration judgments with the help of reputation19, so that the 
enforcement of law by third parties functions on the basis of private arrangements with-
out the use of state coercive power. 
According to the transnationalists' theory, the easing of uncertainty occurs within an 
institutional framework that functions without any state support. Hence, this theory is 
diametrically opposed to those approaches that emphasize the significance of state PIL 
with regard to safeguarding the contractual fulfillment of international exchange proc-
esses. However, both approaches have in common that they refer to an institutional 
mechanism, in which the performance of contractual agreements is safeguarded by the 
organizing activity of a higher third party. 
From these points of view, a third approach can be distinguished according to which 
cross-border transactions can manage even without a regulatory framework organized 
                                                 
16  Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, p. 40, 42; Gaillard, Emmauel, Transnational Law: A 
legal system or a method for decision-making, in: Klaus Peter Berger (Hrsg.), The Practice of Transnational Law, 
The Hague 2001, 53 
17  Sweet Stone, Islands of Transnational Governance, p. 323 
18  See; Berman, Harold, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century, in: 43 Fordham International 
Law Journal (1995), 1617; Berger, Klaus Peter, The New Law Merchant and the Global Marketplace, A 21st 
Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, International Arbitration Law Review (2000), 91; Calliess, 
Gralf Peter, Dietz, Thomas, Konradi, Wioletta, Nieswandt, Holger und Sosa, Fabian, Transformation of Com-
mercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for Globalized Exchange Processes, in: Achim Hurrelmann/Stephan 
Leibfried/Kerstin Martens/Peter Mayer (Hrsg.), Transforming the Golden-Age Nation State, Basingstoke 2007, 
83-108. 
19  Streit und Mangels, Privatautonomes Recht und grenzüberschreitende Transaktionen, p. 88.  
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by third parties.20 Rather, the actors create themselves an institutional environment (in-
formal and spontaneous self-organization), which allows them to conduct international 
transactions. On the basis of game-theoretical assumptions, it is argued here that self-
interested actors do not cooperate in isolated games, but that cooperation becomes of 
more interest once actors interact repeatedly. As long as contractual parties expect that 
the value of continued business transactions is higher in the future than the profit that 
can be achieved by the non-performance of a contract in the present, they follow their 
contractual obligations even without safeguarding the transaction by additional super-
ordinate institutions. 
“The emergence of cooperation is enabled by the fact that players can interact 
over and over again. This implies that present decisions do not only determine 
the outcome of the current exchange, but they also impact on the players' future 
decisions. Hence, the future can cast a shadow over the present and thereby ef-
fect the current strategic situation.”21 
Factually, economic transactions that are safeguarded by repeated interaction are either 
guaranteed by stable bilateral contractual relations22 (relational contracts) or by reputa-
tional networks consisting of several parties. The enforcement of contractual claims 
with the help of the mechanism of repeated interaction implies therefore that past, pre-
sent and future relations are of importance.23 Only this way allows the contractual par-
                                                 
20  See: Belloc, Institutions and International Trade: A Reconsideration of Comparative Advantage, 3. Belloc writes 
on page 6: “Transaction costs affect international trade dynamics in two ways. First, they shape interactions 
among traders and encourage relation-based exchange. Social networks enhance cooperation and trust in inter-
community trade, and cross-border ties help to overcome information and imperfect contract enforcement prob-
lems stemming from long distance between partners.” Note that Steward Macaulay has shown that even within 
national markets businesses often manage their business relationships with no or little and highly selective resort 
to state provided rules and dispute resolution mechanisms. See: Macaulay, Stewart, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Story, in: 28 American Sociological Review (1963), 55. 
21  Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Co-operation, Harmondsworth 1990, p. 12 
22  For a socio-legal view of relational contracts see: Macneil, Ian R., Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Rela-
tionships, Mineola 1971; Macneil, Ian R., Reflections on Relational Contract, in: 141 Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (1985), 541. 
23  The following authors in particular highlight the meaning of ethnic relations and networks for international trade: 
Appelbaum, Richard P., The Future of Law in a global Economy, in: 7 Social & Legal Studies (1998), 171 
Casella, Alessandra und Rauch, James, Anonymous Market and Group Ties in International Trade, Journal of In-
ternational Economics (2002), 19; Gould, David M., Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implica-
tions for U.S. Bilateral Trade Flows, in: 76 The Review of Economics and Statistics (1994), 302; Rauch, James 
und Trinade, Vitor, Ethic Chinese Networks in International Trade, in: 84 Review of Economics and  Statistics 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 100) 
- 6 - 
ties to agree on rules implicitly or explicitly, with which they intend to solve future in-
teraction problems (relational norms), to control rule compliance and to sanction rule 
breaches with the termination of business relations or with the exclusion from the repu-
tational network.24 
In sum, it can be stated that the relevant literature offers highly diverse approaches 
concerning the institutional foundations of cross-border economic exchange processes. 
Despite the numerous contributions to this issue, hitherto there exist hardly any 
comparative empirical studies that analyze the relative importance of those contract 
enforcement institutions in cross-border business stressed by the individual approaches. 
Whether state private law really loses its working capability at the global level and is 
replaced by private institutions, this is a question not yet sufficiently addressed by 
current research.25 Therefore, in the following, the argument draws on a concrete 
empirical example in order to illustrate, which institutions actors really rely on in order 
to safeguard contractual performance in cross-border exchange processes. 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
The focus of the empirical study26 is on cross-border transactions in the software indus-
try. This concerns exchange processes by which an enterprise asks another enterprise 
across borders to develop a software application designed to its very own requirements 
(individual software). In the following, these exchange processes are termed cross-
border software transactions. In detail, 32 qualitative interviews with German, Bulgar-
ian, Rumanian and Indian experts in the software industry were conducted in 2005 and 
2006. They all concerned the question of how German enterprises safeguard the per-
                                                                                                                                               
(2002), 116; Rauch, James Business and Social Networks in International Trade, in: 39 Journal of Economic Lit-
erature (2001), 1177. 
24  For the theoretical foundations of relational contracts see: Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Co-operation, Har-
mondsworth 1990; Abreu, Dilip, Pearce, David G. und Stacchetti, Ennio, Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imper-
fect Monitoring in: 39 Journal of Economic Theory (1991), 251; Dixit, Avinash K., Lawlessness and Economics, 
Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton and Oxford 2004; Townsent, Robert M., Optimal Contracts and 
Competetive Markets with Costly State Verification, in: 21 Journal of Economic Theory (1979), p. 265. 
25  Trebilcock, Michael J. und Leng, Jing, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Devel-
opment, in: 92 Virginia Law Journal (2006), 1517, pp 1540-41; Gessner, Towards a Theoretical Framework for 
Contractual Certainty in Global Trade, p. 10 
26  The empirical study was conceptualized, organized and conducted in collaboration with the economist Holger 
Nieswandt in the context of the research project 'New Forms of Legal Certainty in Globalized Exchange 
Processes' within the The Collaborative Research Center 597 'Transformations of the State' at the University of 
Bremen. 
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formance of contractual obligations, when they order software applications in Asia or 
Eastern Europe. The software industry was chosen as object of research, as it is one of 
the most globalized industries in the world economy and offers therefore optimal condi-
tions for the analysis of the institutional foundations of international exchange proc-
esses. In order to achieve the most comprehensive picture possible, the selection of en-
terprises and interviewees paid attention to deliberately include small (under 100 em-
ployees), medium (100 to 1,000 employees) and larger (over 1,000 employees) enter-
prises into the sample. Furthermore, employees with different expertise and in different 
positions were interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted as non-standardized expert interviews. In detail, the fol-
lowing subjects were addressed in all interviews and complemented by additional ques-
tions: 
The risks of transaction: This subject area includes questions about those risks 
enterprises face when they are involved in cross-border software transactions. 
Private law provided by the state: This subject area includes questions about the sig-
nificance of private law provided by the state for the emergence of cross-border soft-
ware transactions. 
Private order contract enforcement institutions: This subject area includes questions 
about the significance of the above-mentioned private institutions for cross-border soft-
ware transactions. 
The analysis of the interviews applies Philipp Mayring's method of qualitative con-
tents analysis. Accordingly, the empirical data is first reduced systematically so that 
only the essential elements of conversation remain. Then the content of conversation is 
condensed into general statements at a more abstract level.27 The following account in-
cludes only the condensed summary of a wider research process.28 
The risks of transaction 
The analysis of the expert interviews established four main risks German enterprises 
encounter when they order software applications in Eastern Europe or Asia: First, there 
is the risk that the software application ordered is not delivered at the agreed date or, 
                                                 
27  Cf. Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken, p. 42ff. 
28  From a methodical point of view, it should be added that the findings of this study allow no representative 
statements about the institutional foundations of cross-border business in its entirety. The software industry 
certainly provides a particularly suitable research object, in order to analyze the issue of contractual certainty in 
globalized exchange processes. The picture drawn here could look very different for alternative industries and 
country constellations. It requires therefore further research to determine to what extent the results of the 
empirical study are actually generalizable. 
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second, that it does not meet the expected quality standards. Both these risks are par-
ticularly serious, if the customer has a contractual agreement with a third party, whose 
fulfillment requires him to deliver the ordered software application in advance. In order 
to avoid falling behind, the German enterprise has to make sure that the ordered soft-
ware application is delivered punctually and works faultlessly. Third, there is due to the 
almost cost-free reproducibility of software products a high risk that the software sup-
plier resells the same or an only slightly amended version to another enterprise—in the 
worst case to a competitor. From the perspective of the German customer, the question 
arises how the intellectual property rights to the developed software can be secured. 
Fourth, for the buyer of a software application there is the risk that the software pro-
ducer obtains sensitive corporate data during software development, whose use or dis-
tribution could jeopardize the business of the customer. Hence, the German enterprise 
needs a strategy with which it can be as reliable as possible and prevent the passing on 
of confidential information to third parties. 
State private law does not provide contractual certainty 
It has to be asked, then, what significance do German enterprises attribute to the state 
protection of private law in the reduction of these risks. Therefore, the typical structure 
of a software contract has to be outlined. 
Regarding the structure of a software contract, it should at first be said that in gen-
eral, an entire project cannot be covered in a single contract due to the complexity of the 
underlying transactions. Therefore, software transactions usually consist of a number of 
contracts. These are, first, a non-disclosure agreement, which is meant to guarantee that 
confidential information is not passed on to third parties even before a business transac-
tion; second, a framework contract which establishes the fundamental rights and obliga-
tions of the contractual parties for the duration of the business relationship; and, third, 
individual service level agreements, which define the exact extent of work required. 
The empirical findings indicate that the involved actors usually prepare this contrac-
tual edifice with great care. Especially, the work required is comprehensively fixed 
through the creation of so-called requirement or performance specifications; further-
more, the framework contract defines an exact catalogue of sanctions for the case that 
foreign enterprises fall behind with the development of software or fall short of agreed 
quality standards. Moreover, in most cases it is arranged in detail what procedures have 
to be observed, if during a business relationship incidents occur not foreseen by the par-
ties at the moment the contract was concluded (change request, project and executive 
committee, escalation procedures). Additionally, the patterns of conflict resolution are 
exactly pre-determined, in case the parties cannot agree on them once a dispute occurs 
(arbitrator, applicable law, place of jurisdiction). 
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From the perspective of legal sociology, the fact that the global software industry 
usually works with very elaborate contracts suggests at first that the involved parties 
indeed rely heavily on state enforcement authorities, in order to safeguard the perform-
ance of contracts by their foreign business partners.29 State private law would therefore 
be of high significance for the generation of contractual certainty in cross-border busi-
ness transactions. However, as the following will indicate, this provisional conclusion 
cannot be confirmed before the backdrop of the further empirical findings of this study. 
The experts draw an unambiguous picture: There are clear statements in almost all 
interviews according to which the state enforcement of contracts is insignificant for 
generating contractual certainty in cross-border software transactions. This assessment 
refers to all the four mentioned risks facing customers who purchase software applica-
tions in Eastern Europe and Asia. With the help of state private law, it cannot be guaran-
teed that delivery deadlines are met; that the ordered software is of the required quality; 
that there is an exclusive transfer of intellectual property rights; and, finally, that confi-
dential information is kept secret. In the words of an expert interviewed, the software 
contract is "not worth the paper it is written on."30 It can hence be argued that the possi-
bility of enforcing contractual agreements with the help of state enforcement bodies is 
of no importance for German enterprises, when they purchase software applications in 
typical offshore countries like India, Bulgaria or Rumania. 
If one inquires further into the reasons for this far-reaching insignificance of state 
private law, the following picture can be drawn: First, there is deep distrust towards the 
legal systems of offshore states on the part of German enterprises. The interviewed 
German experts therefore refrain from making their contractual relations subject to a 
foreign jurisdiction and contracts are usually concluded according to German law.  
German courts have jurisdiction. The fact that German law is in effect does, how-
ever, not mean that state private law can indeed fulfill its function of enforcing contracts 
and enabling economic cooperation. In principle, it is indeed possible to successfully 
sue a foreign company for the performance of a contract in Germany, yet according to 
the interviewed experts the title cannot be enforced reliably in offshore countries. This 
                                                 
29  In his seminal 1963 article, Steward Macaulay introduced the degree of contractual planning as indicator for the 
significance of state private law for the occurrence and conduct of economic transactions. In contrast to the 
empirical findings of this study, Macaulay, however, argued that (1) "many business exchanges reflect a high 
degree of planning about the four categories—description, contingencies, defective performances and legal 
sanctions—but (2) many, if not most, exchanges reflect no planning or only a minimal amount of it, especially 
concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective performances." Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Story, p. 9. 
30  Interview D-VII, p. 3 
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means that even if the contractual parties have agreed that German law applies, it cannot 
be guaranteed that foreign business partners are effectively sanctioned in case of a 
breach of contract. In the end, state private law remains without effect from the perspec-
tive of a German enterprise, because the territorial confinement of law prevents a reli-
able enforcement of German judgments in Easter Europe and Asia. Second, the inter-
viewed experts stress that state courts are hardly able to contribute to conflict resolution 
in the area of software development due to the technical complexities of the relevant 
subject matters. In order to gain an overview of the situation in a case, the responsible 
judges have to rely on expert reports, which increase the costs of proceedings enor-
mously. Moreover, expert reports do not always bring more clarity; rather they often 
intensify the conflict, when a conflict among experts ensues. Before this backdrop, it is 
hardly astonishing that judges tend to "push" cases "towards settlement"31. The result is 
that it becomes hardly worthwhile to involve state courts, even for a party that thinks it 
is in the right. The outcome of proceedings is too uncertain; the costs for the involved 
experts are too high. In short, entirely independent from the territorial confines of state 
law, the insignificance of state private law can also be attributed to the lack of contrac-
tual certainty in the area of software development. 
In general, it can therefore be established that state private law is of no significance 
for German customers purchasing software applications in offshore countries, because 
on the one hand the outcome of proceedings in state courts is highly uncertain but 
causes high costs. While, on the other hand, the title of a German court, if acquired, 
cannot reliably be enforced in typical offshore countries. 
The alternative meaning of contracts 
At this point, one issue remains open. Why do German enterprises conclude detailed 
contracts, as outlined above, in order to purchase software abroad, although these con-
tracts generate no contractual certainty? From an economic perspective, it is hardly sen-
sible to use resources for the design and negotiation of contracts, if they remain ulti-
mately without effect on transactions. Which purpose do contracts fulfill, if they do not 
generate contractual certainty? 
Although this aspect is not at the center of this study, some interesting insights can 
be won from the expert interviews: Accordingly, enterprises need contracts in order to 
define their legal relationship with third parties not directly involved in the transaction. 
This can concern insurance companies, banks and tax authorities. More concretely, con-
tracts are the basis for the conclusion of an insurance, the granting of a credit or the de-
termination of a tax liability. Contracts are therefore necessary documents for the par-
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ticipation in modern business life, independent of their actual function—the generation 
of contractual certainty. The empirical findings furthermore demonstrate that contracts 
can also be used to legitimize the actions of a company's management vis-à-vis its own-
ers. No corporate management would like to be accused of acting without a valid con-
tract in case a transaction with a foreign company fails. On the part of the owner, this 
would be seen as flawed behavior and would have negative career effects. Contracts are 
therefore concluded because the members of the corporate management "have to guard 
their back"32 for the case that things go awry. However, the most important function of 
the contract is the one as communication document. In cross-border intercultural busi-
ness relationships, no common socio-cultural norms exist that could implicitly govern 
the exchange beyond the contract itself. There (still) exists no transnational business 
culture. At the transnational level, enterprises are far more than in the domestic context 
dependent on the detailed explication of the behavior they expect from their business 
partners and on turning their expectations into the written form of a contract. In this 
sense, an expert stresses that although contracts do not generate contractual certainty 
“[…] one still needs a contract as the basis of cooperation so that everyone 
knows what one talks about and what is expected.”33 (Translation Thomas Dietz) 
Contracts and the private law applicable to them are hence means of communication, 
which can be easier universalized than social norms reproduced in exclusive ethnic or 
social contexts. Contracts serve mutual communication but not the enforcement of legal 
claims. 
Private contract enforcement institutions establish contractual certainty 
The account above indicates that contracts and state private law take on numerous alter-
native meanings, but they do not create contractual certainty for German enterprises 
ordering software applications in Eastern Europe or Asia. But if German enterprises 
cannot resort to state enforcement authorities, in order to safeguard their transactions 
against opportunist behavior, how do they manage to safeguard the performance of con-
tracts by their foreign offshore providers? This question has to be answered in the fol-
lowing. 
Relational contracts 
The initiation of relational contractual relationships: At first, it can be said that German 
enterprises subject their potential business partners to a comprehensive evaluation proc-
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ess in the run-up to a transaction. In addition to the competence of a potential transac-
tion partner, also their reliability is checked. In other words, before a transaction starts 
German enterprises pay particular attention to choose only enterprises that show a low 
risk of defaulting behavior.34 In this test, German enterprises evaluate three aspects in 
particular. First, it is checked, how much the enterprise invests into the quality of its 
employees. In this context, the German enterprise is interested in the number but also 
the exact qualification of the staff of the foreign provider. Concerning employee qualifi-
cations, German actors attribute particular importance, apart from university degrees, to 
fee and examination-based training certificates from multinational corporations, like, for 
instance, Microsoft, SAP or IBM. Second, it is checked, how much a potential business 
partner invests into the quality of its production processes. This evaluation is conducted 
based on quality standards but also on test projects. Concerning the quality standards, 
there is a distinction to be made between certificates issued by professional standardiza-
tion bodies (like ISO, SEI35) and certificates issued by well-known multinational enter-
prises (like Microsoft Gold Partner, IBM Certified Partner). In this context, it is interest-
ing that the certificates of big multinational corporations are apparently given more im-
portance than the quality standards of professional standardization bodies. The reason 
for this difference in significance is especially the fact that although standardization 
bodies establish global unitary norms, national offices, which apply different standards 
of accuracy in the certification process, supervise them. 
“Sure, I trust the certificates of globally active enterprises more than those 
based on globally valid norm, as individual monitoring bodies in individual 
countries supervise the latter. A certificate under the ISO 9.000 standard is, for 
                                                 
34  The following interview passage illustrates in exemplary manner, what is meant by reliability test: "If someone 
invests a certain amount of money to build up a business, he shows that he will be serious. It is the same with the 
companies in Rumania. Usually after I am contracting them, who are you, how many employees do you have, 70, 
ok. You have an office? ‘Yes’. That is why we have such a nice office; we have video cameras outside, all kinds 
of good networks. This is an investment of two million Euros. If I put so much money in the environment that 
means that I have the capability to do such a good job. Nobody is investing two million Dollars into nothing." 
Interview BR-III, p. 11 
35  The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is a network of national standardization institutions in 
147 countries with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. For the software industry decisive is certification 
according to IS0 9,000. The SEI (Software Engineering Institute) is a state financed research and development 
center, which is supported by the US ministry of defense and situated at the Carnegie Mellon University. 
Regarding cross-border software development, the CMM (Capability Maturity Model) has become the best-
known quality certification. See, for further information, Amberg, Michael, IT-Offshoring. Management 
Internationaler IT-Outsourcing Projekte, Heidelberg 2005, Chap 5. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 100) 
- 13 - 
instance, in Germany monitored by a certification center, accredited in Ger-
many. In Italy, it is monitored by an Italian body, etc. I wouldn't like to compare 
a German body with an Egyptian or Sudanese one—to take it to the extreme.”36 
(Translation Thomas Dietz) 
Third, it is examined to what extent the enterprise has invested in its production facili-
ties. To do this, production sites are usually visited in person, in order to review the 
quality of the business premises and of the technical infrastructure as well as the in-
vestments into the physical and virtual security arrangements. A potential foreign busi-
ness partner, who has made significant investments in all three areas, signals the Ger-
man company credibly that he is interested in long-term business success and will there-
fore behave cooperatively. From the perspective of the German enterprise, with these 
points a fundamental precondition is met for further cooperation on the basis of private 
institutions. 
At this point, it remains to note that the German companies make extensive use of 
modern information and communication technologies (ICT) during the above described 
reliability test of potential transaction partners. Initial information on the number of 
employees or the certifications a company holds are obtained directly by German com-
panies through a thorough search of the websites of the foreign potential transaction 
partners. In a further step, the German company receives additional information, such as 
the detailed qualifications of each employee, by sending a detailed questionnaire to for-
eign providers, which are completed and returned to the German companies. Only when 
these Internet-based pre-examinations have been completed successfully, staff members 
of the German enterprise will visit the production sites of the foreign provider in person, 
in order to gain a final impression about the latter's willingness to cooperate. The fol-
lowing interview passage illustrates this point in exemplary fashion again: 
“At the moment, many first contacts are established via the Web. It plays a very 
prominent role. They do research on the Internet, and in this way learn to know 
each other somewhat. Then, they will exchange information at first. Sure, at 
some point these people have to meet.”37 (Translation Thomas Dietz) 
The implementation of relational contractual relationships: The phase of initiation is 
finally followed by the implementation of the transaction. Here, it turns out that soft-
ware development contracts are usually divided into different stages (milestones). This 
means that the final product is not delivered in one piece at the end of the transaction; 
rather it is spread gradually throughout the entire development process. At the end of 
each milestone phase, a comprehensive test is conducted, in which the German client 
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reviews with the help of predefined quality criteria; whether the delivered intermediate 
product meets the agreed specifications. The German company then pays according to 
the progress of the project, either a fixed agreed milestone payment (fix-contracts) or 
the working hours spent by the foreign software producer to reach the milestone (time 
and material contracts). Only with the last milestone payment, the transaction is then 
completed entirely. 
However, if the foreign supplier cannot fulfill the milestone-related quality criteria as 
agreed or exceeds the delivery time, the German company can then suspend payments 
after a short grace period and, finally, even end the business relationship with low costs 
involved (exit clause). For suppliers, this means that they have to endeavor to meet the 
contractual requirements in every milestone phase, as this is the only way to reach the 
next level of payment. However, if he behaves opportunistically, the prospect of future 
earnings are lost with the German enterprise terminating the business relationship. Ob-
viously, by this structuring of the contractual relationship into various milestone phases 
bound to testing, the German companies establish a simple but highly effective means 
for controlling the actions of their providers. In this sense, German companies perceive 
"payment arrangements"38 as more important than "legal terms"39 and the option to re-
fuse to pay bills is deemed to be a "massive lever"40 to enforce contractual claims. 
In short, by structuring the business relationship in milestone phases, the transaction 
turned from a simple prisoner's dilemma into a repeated game. In other words, the con-
sciously created shadow of the future41 gives the foreign supplier an incentive to reliably 
fulfill contractual agreements. 
The monitoring of relational contractual relationships: Modern economic exchange 
processes can be conducted both as market transactions as well as within the hierarchi-
cal structure of an enterprise. It is the central concern of transaction cost theory (make 
or buy decision) to specify the conditions under which it is more efficient to chose one 
or the other governance mode; but this needs not to be of detailed concern in the follow-
ing. In the context of this study, it is however important to note that the governance 
structures of these two transaction types, market and hierarchy, differ among other 
things fundamentally in the way they arrange the monitoring of the involved parties. If a 
transaction is handled via the market, the contract serves as the basis for monitoring: 
The contract determines the required services and products as well as the time when the 
contractual performance is due. When this point in time has come, it can be verified on 
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the basis of the contract whether the transaction partner has met the contractual obliga-
tions. In other words, the monitoring is done with regard to the achieved result and 
works therefore indirectly and impersonally, as the transaction partner is not directly 
monitored during the provision of services. In the case of a company, however, different 
units cooperate on the basis of plans, which are set by the corporate management and 
controlled bureaucratically. Here, individual employees are supervised directly and per-
sonally at their work place during their performance by their superiors. 
A particularly interesting finding of the empirical study is that especially major Ger-
man companies safeguard the monitoring of their foreign transaction partners not only 
indirectly with the help of the contractual obligations and specifications—as would be 
typical for a transaction between independent enterprises—but they rely also on other 
control systems, which structurally correspond more to the governance mode of hierar-
chy than of a market transaction. 
The expert interviews show in detail that the foreign providers allow their German 
clients direct access to their company-internal project management systems, so that 
German enterprises can monitor and control the process of software development di-
rectly. Although legally separate entities are formally concerned in this process, the 
companies involved create in this way a common relational structure, which transcends 
a merely contractual relationship. From the level of project managers up to senior man-
agement, a system of monitoring and reporting is established between the involved cor-
porate units, which is based on monthly or weekly reports and includes in extreme cases 
even the real-time monitoring of foreign providers—when the German client can watch 
"live" what happens on the computers of the foreign provider (real-time controlling). 
“One uncertainty of the customer is losing control. Usually he has a customer 
and a contract with that customer, with deadlines. He has to deliver good qual-
ity. Then there is a problem in the project management: You ask the project 
manager: Have you started the project? He says: Yes, and he did not. How much 
have you completed? 50 Percent and so on. You lose control of deadlines. So, in 
the sales process you have to show him that you have a project management sys-
tem. He can get in, you give him a password, and he can get in to check.”42 
In this context, the expert interviews indicate very clearly that this comprehensive and 
direct supervision of the foreign transaction partner would not be possible without the 
precondition created in recent years by technological advances in the information and 
communication technologies. According to the interviewed experts, this is reflected, for 
example, by the fact that the above described system of monitoring and reporting is 
usually web-based. This means that the provider sets up an Internet portal, where he 
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deposits those documents required for monitoring purposes; these password protected 
documents can then be accessed by the client from any point in the earth, given that an 
Internet connection is available. In addition, information that serves the control of the 
transaction partner can, if necessary, be sent cheaply and quickly via the Internet or be 
acquired by oral reports via telephone and videoconference. 
In short, the comprehensive technological interlink of the transaction partners in-
creases the transparency on the side of the customer significantly. With this the German 
company is able to immediately identify opportunistic behavior of the foreign provider 
in the course of the relational contractual relationships and to react with the appropriate 
sanctions, even before.  At the end of the respective milestone stage it turns out that the 
foreign partner was not able to perform the contractual arrangements reliably. The un-
certainty related to software transactions is again significantly reduced. 
The limits of relational contracts: As the following interview passage illustrates, re-
lational contracts meet the limits of their effectiveness, despite all the extensive techno-
logical surveillance, if a business relationship comes close to its end. 
“Specifically, there is a critical risk in paying the last milestone, because it may 
turn out that the product is still faulty after it ran some time in practice.”43 
(Translation Thomas Dietz) 
To avoid this risk, the contract contains a clause that obligates the provider to offer cor-
rections to the software free of charge for a certain time (in this case one year) after de-
livery. The difficulty now is to enforce this agreement, as the customer has lost effective 
means of sanctioning and therefore control after the payment of the last milestone. 
As a solution to this problem, the experts mention, on the one hand, the possibility of 
delaying the payment of the last milestone as long as possible, in order to retain a means 
of sanctioning, or on the other hand to continue the repeated game by further future or-
ders. In the following section, however, it will turn out that for the enforcement of this 
rectification agreement the mechanism of reputational networks can be of crucial impor-
tance, transcending the bilateral level. 
Reputational networks 
Before beginning a business relationship, German enterprises usually consult a list of 
references, which shows those businesses as a potential transaction partner cooperated 
with in the past. These reference lists are an integral part of the web presence of foreign 
providers and are therefore directly available to German companies. In general, these 
reference lists are used as a starting point by German enterprises in order to do further 
research into the exchange history of a potential foreign business partner. In this it is 
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common to phone or email the reference providers directly, in order to find out how a 
potential transaction partner actually behaved in past exchange situations. The exchange 
of information can here be so intense that not only the management exchanges informa-
tion on potential foreign business partners, but also the personnel that was directly in-
volved in the technical implementation of a project. What is striking is that in this con-
text the experts interviewed attribute particularly high significance to the references of 
large multinational corporations. The reason is that in the case of large companies the 
perceived risk is smaller that two players agree strategically to draw the picture of a 
foreign potential transaction partner in an all too positive light. 
It is questionable at this point, however, why German customers trust the information 
given by other companies at all. Ultimately, on the part of the reference provider there is 
no incentive to help a company in finding a suitable foreign partner. The solution to this 
matter is that, first, it is usually avoided to inquire with direct competitors, and, second, 
experts would immediately lose their status if they disseminated false information 
within their industry: 
“If you are asked as an expert by another expert, then you even tell a competi-
tor: this company is really excellent. If you give false information, you can forget 
about your status as an expert. Things like this spread quickly.”44 (Translation 
Thomas Dietz) 
In other words, the reference providers are themselves embedded in reputational net-
works, which safeguard the reliability of their information.  
Yet, the crucial factor here is that foreign providers know that their potential custom-
ers are in touch with each other and exchange information about them: 
“We think that if we try to give a commitment to the customer and the chances 
are that we may not be able to meet, then in the long term this causes big prob-
lems. It is a network society and word will easily go around.”45 
In this way, German enterprises generate another trilateral means in order to safeguard 
contract performance by the foreign provider, in addition to the above-mentioned possi-
bility to end the business relationship (bilateral governance). For the case of a breach of 
contract, the foreign supplier must not only fear to lose its direct business partner, but 
against the backdrop of communicating reference networks, there is also the danger that 
it will find no more alternative transaction partners in future. Once the past behavior of 
a foreign supplier is not only known by its direct opposite, but also by any other poten-
tial customer, the breach of contract leads to a loss of reputation of the foreign provider 
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within the "business community", which ultimately renders unlikely its survival at the 
market. 
As the following passage illustrates, the loss of reputation is seen as such a strong 
threat to business success that foreign providers only engage into a transaction, if they 
actually belief that they can meet the expectations of their customer with some certainty. 
The high importance of the reputational mechanism for the creation of contractual cer-
tainty is here again emphasized: 
“It is a very competitive work. So, delivery, commitments that are made by com-
panies like us, if you don’t do this, it is not just a question of losing that half-
million Dollars or Euros. It is a total incredibility in the business. It’s a small 
world. If I work with Audi tomorrow, they will say: can you give me a reference 
of another large German company? Now, if I have done a bad job, how can I 
request a reference? So, I know the repercussions of not delivering. Sometimes I 
leave it because I cannot deliver.”46 
The empirical results indicate further that German companies are supported, on the one 
hand, by foreign trade chambers and, on the other hand, by various trade associations in 
their quest for a suitable offshore provider. 
Foreign trade chambers: Foreign trade chambers mainly support German companies 
by passing on their order requests to foreign members at a cost and by returning offers 
to the German companies. In this context, it should be noted, however, that foreign 
trade chambers have formally no other ordering function beyond this mere brokering 
activity: They do neither publish black lists, in which the misconduct of foreign compa-
nies were documented, nor do they exclude companies systematically from their organi-
zation when they have breached a contract in the course of a business relationship. The 
generation of contractual certainty is therefore not among the official duties of foreign 
trade chambers. 
At the informal level, a different picture emerges. It indicates that the employees of 
foreign trade chambers collect informally important information about the transaction 
behavior of their members and pass them on to German companies, in order to warn 
them about business partners with a bad reputation: 
“Reputation is our strong point. We do not publish information about compa-
nies, this is not allowed. But we have this knowledge already. And the Indian 
companies know that we are also very close to the consultants. We are also very 
close to the German community, on a one to one basis. But this is nothing offi-
cial, because you asked me if there is a process in place, we cannot have this. 
We cannot say: here, there is a blacklist. This is not allowed. We cannot do that. 
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But, the Indian companies know already that in different forums we can discuss 
this issue. And if a German company should come to us saying: Ok, I am going 
to do business with  such and such a company, do you think that is safe, do you 
have a background, we may not even write it down in correct words because 
then it comes to defamation. But we could always pick up the phone and tell 
them: no, they have done wrong sometimes, so please watch out. That we would 
still do. And we are very well knit with the chamber of commerce in Germany, so 
there is a forum where we can talk about these things.”47 
In short, the foreign trade chambers become an important part of the above described 
informal reference networks through which German companies control their foreign 
transaction partners. 
Trade associations: In addition to the foreign trade chambers, various trade associa-
tions, such as the BITKOM48, support German enterprises in their quest for foreign 
software suppliers. A widespread means for promoting cross-border cooperation is the 
organization of contact forums, so-called match-making events, to which the trade asso-
ciations invite both targeted German and foreign companies, in order to facilitate busi-
ness contacts for both sides. As the foreign trade chambers, trade associations refrain, 
however, in the run-up to these events from systematically reviewing the transaction 
histories of the participants, in order to ensure that only reliable companies participate in 
match-making events. This means that trade associations also focus primarily on the 
initiation of business contacts; but they do not create marketplaces with their own rules 
and arbitration, as would be characteristic for a private legal system based on the princi-
ples of Lex Mercatoria. 
The account of the importance of trade associations for the generation of contractual 
certainty would, however, be incomplete, if it remained limited to the organization of 
match-making events. Before the backdrop of the question about the institutional foun-
dation for cross-border software transactions, much more important than the organiza-
tion of these contact forums is the fact that the association links their members exten-
sively. The BITKOM, for example, represents according to its self-description 
“[...] a big, powerful network and brings together the best minds and companies 
in the digital world. BITKOM organizes an ongoing exchange between profes-
sionals and managers and provides its members with platforms for cooperation 
among themselves and for the contact with key customers.”49 (Translation Tho-
mas Dietz) 
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In BITKOM's nearly 100 professional working groups about 6,000 experts of the Ger-
man IT industry are organized, and even if only few working groups address the issue 
of cross-border software transactions directly, this tight network still implies that Ger-
man companies are constantly in touch with each other. Regarding the problem of con-
tractual certainty, this means: Via the networks of the association, German companies 
learn "very quickly"50 in an informal way "who behaves badly and where."51 Like the 
foreign trade chambers, the trade associations also encourage to a considerable extent 
the informal exchange of information between German companies. Thus, they also be-
come an important part of the above mentioned informal reference networks, but with-
out reaching the organizational degree of a transnational private legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
The starting point for the empirical analysis was the question of whether state private 
law looses its function to enforce contracts effectively and to enable economic coopera-
tion in the wake of economic globalization, and whether it becomes therefore replaced 
by non-state private institutions at the global level. To inquire into this question, the 
software industry was chosen as a particularly suitable research example due to its high 
degree of internationalization. In concrete terms, it was examined which institutions 
offer a sufficient degree of contractual certainty when German enterprises purchase 
software in India and Eastern Europe. The findings of the empirical study can be sum-
marized and theoretically categorized as follows: 
Despite the fact that the enterprises involved usually settle on very detailed contracts, 
from the perspective of German companies state private law is of no significance for 
safeguarding contractual performance in cross-border software transactions. Contracts 
are necessary documents in order to participate in modern business life. For the man-
agement of an enterprise, they serve as a means of legitimation vis-à-vis its owners, and 
they ease communication in intercultural contexts. Furthermore, they are in need due to 
tax reasons, but they provide no contractual certainty for German customers purchasing 
software in Eastern Europe or Asia. As illustrated above, the view mainly advocated by 
lawyers can therefore not be confirmed, according to which cross-border transactions at 
least approximate national transactions with regard to the problem of contractual cer-
tainty due to working collision law norms. The empirical findings clearly prove that 
actors do not rely on state courts and enforcement authorities, in order to enforce con-
tractual agreements in cross-border transactions. Mainly, two reasons are decisive for 
the insignificance of state private law: First, the outcome of costly proceedings in state 
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courts is highly uncertain due to the high complexity of software development. Second, 
even if a state court has come to a verdict, claims cannot reliably be enforced across 
borders. This means that for German enterprises the use of state private law as an insti-
tution of contractual enforcement turns out to be both costly and ineffective and is hence 
avoided. 
However, if German businesses cannot rely on state private law, how do they ensure 
the contractual performance of their foreign offshore providers? The empirical findings 
concerning this question can be summarized as follows: 
First, German costumers check the reliability of a potential foreign business partner 
on the basis of specific investments before a business transaction even takes place. 
Then, they divide transactions into different milestone phases and thereby transform the 
transaction from a simple prisoner's dilemma into a repeated game. At the end of every 
milestone phase, the German enterprise can decide whether it wants to continue or to 
end business dealings (bilateral sanction). Thereby, the looming loss of future business 
opportunities keeps foreign suppliers cooperative and from turning opportunist. In short, 
the businesses involved create the institutional context themselves, which enables them 
to conduct cross-border software transactions. They design the exchange in a way so 
that contracts are fulfilled without outside intervention. 
German enterprises control the activities of their foreign business partners not only 
with the help of bilateral sanctions but also additionally, cross-border software transac-
tions are embedded into overarching reputational networks, which consist of companies, 
foreign trade chambers and trade associations. Hence, there is a further mechanism with 
which German customers can safeguard the contractual performance of foreign provid-
ers. For the case of a breach of contract, foreign providers have not only to fear that they 
lose their direct business partner, but there is the additional risk that they lose their repu-
tation and become excluded from the business community due to the informal but inten-
sive information exchange between German enterprises, foreign trade chambers and 
trade associations (trilateral sanction). In addition to relational contracts, for German 
enterprises the mechanism of reputational networks is of particular significance in order 
to safeguard the contractual performance of cross-border software-transactions. In con-
trast, formally organized, private systems of law, which are based on norms of the New 
Law Merchant, play no role in the provision of contractual certainty. 
It should further be noted that German enterprises comprehensively use the opportu-
nities offered by new developments in information and communication technology, 
when it comes to the initiation or control of their foreign business relations. Due to such 
technical innovation, it therefore seems that these two informal and spontaneous institu-
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tions of contractual enforcement—reputational networks and relational contracts—gain 
more and more efficiency compared to state private law.52 
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